

as every third adult (aged 15–49 years) is reported to be thin (BMI less than 18.5). According to the latest report on the state of food insecurity in rural India, more than 1.5 million children are at risk of becoming malnourished because of rising global food prices.”

11. We just do not know enough about the other worlds yet, even if we keep in mind Appadurai's contention that the most localized of Indian worlds have become “inflected—even afflicted—by cosmopolitan scripts that drive the politics of families, the frustrations of laborers, the dreams of local headmen” (1996, 63).

TWO

A Different History of the Present

THE MOVEMENT OF CROPS, CUISINES,
AND GLOBALIZATION

Akhil Gupta

INTRODUCTION

GLOBALIZATION AS A PHENOMENON has captured the popular and scholarly imagination in the First World in the last two decades. Much of this discussion of globalization has turned on trade and economic issues, and on the very visible worldwide diffusion of media and popular culture. Thanks to a series of highly visible protests against the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, first in Seattle, and then successively in Prague, Washington DC, Genoa, and New York, globalization has become a contested term in popular discourse. Nowhere is this more evident than in recent controversies about the safety, reliability, and sustainability of food. Issues of food safety hit the headlines because of the export of contaminated milk from China, but have also been raised with regard to the long-term health effects of genetically modified foods. Concern about the reliability of food supplies was underscored by global food shortages that resulted in food riots in many countries for the first time in living memory. Droughts in food-exporting countries such as Australia, which may be caused by global warming, long and complex commodity chains, especially when they involve the processing and transportation of fresh meat, fruits, and vegetables; and the use of commodities such as corn for fuel and animal feed have all been identified as causes of global food shortages. Finally, a growing interest in sustainability, alongside concerns about safety and reliability, have prompted a movement to consume food that is grown locally. Known by several names—locavores, slow food—this movement emphasizes buying food directly from the farmer, thereby reducing the commodity chain to its minimum, and eating food that is grown sustainably (itself measured by

land conservation, the carbon footprint of the commodity, or the measure of virtual water that it contains).¹

I will use the movement of crops, changing culinary practices, and shifting habits of food consumption to argue that food and foodstuffs have played a critical, and perhaps under-appreciated, role in the long history of globalization. In the contemporary moment, much has been made about the impact of the global circulation of news, films, music, and fashions. However, not enough attention has been paid to how cultures, histories, and identities have been shaped by the movement of cuisines and foods. What does a deeper history of globalization as seen through crops, cuisines, and consumption tell us about the historical shaping of identities?

FOOD AND GLOBALIZATION

I will begin by offering some theoretical reflections on the location of food in the broader debate about "globalization." One can identify at least two broad positions on the phenomenon of globalization, which have to be understood sequentially. In response to the paucity of globalization that accompanied the neoliberal expansion of capitalism in the last quarter of the twentieth century, came the response that there was nothing new about globalization. Although the energy of the first position came largely from the business world (Friedman 2000, 2005), it found strong support in a kind of multiculturalist discourse that was unaware of its own imperial centrality, and it also received encouragement from commercial cultural production in spheres like film, television, and music. In academic fields, it produced broadly convergent positions between disciplines that normally are on opposite sides, like economics and literary and cultural studies. The opposition to this view also sometimes came from the same disciplines, but mainly from historians (Hopkins 2002; F. Cooper 2001).

In food studies, these two trends coexisted, but while the globalization of food has attracted a great deal of attention in the last decade, it has not led to the dichotomies and polemics that characterize the literature on globalization more broadly. Why is that the case? I suggest that here we need to pay attention to the relative autonomy of intellectual fields. The rise of "fusion" food, exotic ingredients, and the relentless and never-ending search for the "new," fueled by an enormous rise in popularity of food shows on television, food films, travel shows that were mostly about food, do draw upon some of

the same energies of capitalist consumerism that have informed the celebratory wing of globalization in other domains. However, these trends have been accompanied by the enormous popularity of books on the history of food. The question of the origins of foods, and the circulation of foodstuffs from their places of origin to their place of consumption, has become of abiding interest to "foodies" as well as to scholars.² The result is that, at least in the West, an awareness of the history of the origins of food and its global circulation has developed alongside the trend toward consuming the global.

This fact has significant implications for how globalization is understood. The knowledge of globalization that has been propagated in popular culture and scholarly circles through food has largely avoided the dualisms and polemics that often seem to have settled onto the general literature on globalization. This difference in understanding between food studies and other fields leads to a question about what is lost analytically when we talk of globalization in the singular. Is globalization one phenomenon, or many different ones that have converged to create the illusion of unitariness? Alternatively, are these different phenomena simply confused with one another? Food studies helps push the position that we need to think of globalizations as discrepant and diverse rather than singular and unified.

Globalization is not a unique "thing" that can be charted in a unitary and definitive fashion for at least three reasons. First, the meaning of globalization diverges according to the phenomenon or sector being analyzed: thus an understanding of globalization derived from an examination of global financial flows differs substantially from another that looks at the exchange of biogenetic materials. Secondly, globalization appears very different in distinct geographical and spatial settings. Finally, globalization means very different things to diversely situated groups of people. Food studies help us make the argument that we need to move beyond the sweeping character of some of the pronouncements about globalization in the contemporary world by attending to the situational and conjunctural nature of "the global." Even as we engage from our various subject positions the ethico-political imperative to name, define, and debate "the global," we should be keenly aware of the futility of the task. An acknowledgment of the impossibility of mapping globalization in the face of the necessity of doing so makes it possible to more clearly engage the politics of what Tsing has called "the culture and politics of scale making" (2000: 330).⁴

Despite the pronouncements of some economists and politicians, the contemporary form of globalization does not represent the inevitable march of

history.⁵ Many aspects of life in the twentieth century appear to have reversed earlier processes of globalization. One such process involved the movement of food through the *people* who transported foods and foodways from one location to another.⁶ If one looks at the mobility of populations, the absolute numbers of people who moved from one state boundary to another in the nineteenth century may very well have been comparable to immigration in the world today. Despite the fact that we like to think that the population movements in the world today are historically unprecedented, the *proportion* of the population that migrated in the nineteenth century certainly exceeded anything in the present. Just think of the millions of people who migrated from Europe to the far corners of the world: the Americas especially, but also South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and different colonial areas in Africa and Asia, and in addition there were those who traveled, temporarily or permanently, from one nation-state in Europe to another. As many as one hundred million people are estimated to have moved in the nineteenth century, half of whom were European (Held, McGew, Goldblat, and Perraton 1999: 311–314; Mintz 1985: 71). They took with them their own food cultures and knowledges, and this has profoundly altered the character of “national” cuisines (Möhring 2008). The construction of a “national” cuisine often rests on the “forgetting” or suppression of the foreignness of its foods and foodways, which are, not surprisingly, associated with immigrant food and immigrant peoples.⁷ However, there are important exceptions to such a statement. For example, the “national” cuisine in the United States is seen as a result of the various cuisines of dominant European immigrant groups.

This brings me to my second point, which has to do with the unevenness and contradictoriness of globalization. Globalization is best seen not as a set of flows, but pathways for transactions or exchanges that depend on the reconfiguration of existing structural and social conditions (Held et. al. 1999: 1–28; Tsing 2000: 460). These pathways ensure that flows are highly unequal and asymmetrical. In its late-twentieth-century form, globalization in fact has sharply differentiated the ease, speed, and direction in which different things have flowed. On one end are finances, images, and communications, which now move around the globe at dizzying speeds; on the other end are flows of people and biogenetic resources, which move much more haltingly and unidirectionally. Somewhere in the middle are flows of goods, technologies, and ideas. From immigration laws to regimes of intellectual property rights, multiple barriers to mobility exist; these are stratified by geopolitical location, class, gender, and race. The acceleration of financial transactions is

often commented on as a distinctive feature of globalization, but the increasing barriers being placed on the movement of immigrants should also be seen as part of the same phenomenon.

It is interesting that many of the contemporary movements and protests against globalization have targeted fast-food companies. For example, French farmers led by José Bové protesting global trade agreements chose to attack a McDonald’s restaurant in 1999. The asymmetry of global “flows” is clearly seen in the fact that corporations based in the West have been able to expand rapidly in the rest of the world, particularly catering to a fast-growing middle class in countries like India, whereas farmers from the Third World who wish to sell primary goods in First World markets have a much harder time negotiating the regulatory apparatus, and often have to face protective tariffs, in places such as Europe.

The third point that I have to make about globalization is that globalization is the name for a process that is observed from somewhere, by someone.⁸ The breathless excitement with which globalization has been greeted by some may be intimately related to the anxiety that it has provoked in others in that both sets of people seem to be operating with a common narrative about the nation-state. To caricature this narrative, it goes something like this: for the first three quarters of the twentieth century, economic and social life was carried out within a framework in which the territorial state was paramount, and where nationalism provided the ideology of community, which allowed for a regime of regulation characterized by a tripartite relation between capital, labor, and the state apparatus. This is the Fordist compact, which was realized perhaps most fully in social democratic regimes or welfare states. (Harvey 1992). However, in the last twenty-five years, the territorial pact between capital and labor has been broken, so that a gap has opened up between the territorially expansive reorganization of capital on a global scale and the nationally limited character of state regulation and of labor organizing. “The economic” and “the social,” which used to map onto the same territory, are now separated; and this separation has given rise to a crisis of representation and meaning on one side (which I think is expressed in the contentious character of nationalism today, ever more strident and xenophobic) and a crisis of regulation on the other: as the regulatory mechanisms that were founded on territorial nation-states and the international system of states find themselves out of sync with dominant economic institutions.

Notice the kind of story that is being caricatured here: first there was the sovereign, territorial nation-state, and then there was globalization, with its

attendants gains and painful effects. This raises an important question: Can a different history of the present be narrated? It becomes clear that such a narrative of globalization makes little sense if one sees it from the perspective of a poor person in Bangladesh, Trinidad, or Lesotho. Only in a few nation-states in the First and Second Worlds was the sovereign, territorial state and the provisioning of social welfare a convincing fiction to the majority of their populations. For most other parts of the world, and particularly for subaltern peoples, the twentieth century has not been so much an interruption, as a continuation, of processes of globalization that date at least to the age of European exploration, and in the case of most of Asia, to a much earlier period. A global history of globalization would account not only for non-Western genealogies (Hopkins 2002: 2) but also for subaltern histories. The production, distribution, and consumption of food provides us with excellent material to pursue such a history.

If one looks at the Indian Ocean, for example, in an area that includes coastal East Africa, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian subcontinent, and what is now Southeast Asia (and beyond the Indian Ocean region, coastal China and Japan), one finds a long history of connection. These connections probably reached their zenith from the twelfth century onwards, and especially during the century between the latter half of the thirteenth century and first half of the fourteenth (i.e., from 1250–1350). During this time, long-distance trade over land, but especially over sea, had resulted in a truly spectacular set of economic relations and cultural encounters. Economies around the world connected by these routes boomed, as did new forms of cultural expression (Abu-Lughod 1989).

If one wished to explain the nature of politics, societies, and cultures in these places, one needed to look not just at a culture area or empire, not at their encounters with peoples over the next hill, but around the Indian Ocean. For example, goods such as silks and porcelain flowed out of China and rapidly affected tastes around the Indian Ocean (hence we talk even now of dining on “fine China”); Arabian horses were exported to India and changed transportation and military strategy in the subcontinent (Chaudhuri 1985: 108); coffee went from the Yemeni port of Mocha via Egypt to Amsterdam and London in the late seventeenth century, and then was grown in Java to meet European demand, becoming a part of their and our lives to such an extent that many people would be unable to function without it (Hartox 1985: 23; Wickizer 1951: 66–67; Chaudhuri 1985: 31); and incense

from the Middle East became central to the ritual life of South Asia and China (Chaudhuri 1985: 18).⁹ The point I wish to make here is that premodern globalization, much of which took place before the fifteenth century, was not a “shallow” phenomenon. It did not merely influence the lives of those who lived in coastal areas, along the great ocean trade routes, and those who lived on the vast, intercontinental land routes like the Silk Route, but affected the intimate lives of people far from these places. Religion and ritual, typically regarded as intimate and community centered, were profoundly shaped by these global movements, as were ideas and images, and material artifacts in which people dressed and ate; in short, if one thinks of the extensiveness, reach, and sociological importance of these earlier moments of globalization, they may have been even more far-reaching than anything we might observe today.

Such a claim, of course, immediately raises important questions of metrics and methods: how is one to measure the “degree” of globalization? Nowhere is this question more problematic than in the realm of ideas and everyday practices. Held, McGew, Goldblatt, and Perraton argue that if one weighs the extensiveness, intensity, velocity, and impact of global interconnections, then the period before European empires was characterized by *thin globalization* (1999: 21–27). From the perspective of a devout Indonesian Muslim, Held, McGew, Goldblatt, and Perraton’s assertion that the “impact” of global flows before European empires was “low” might appear rather puzzling, if not blatantly Eurocentric.¹⁰ It might be helpful to remember that the great diffusion of world religions took place well before the period of European empires, that is, in the era that Held, McGew, Goldblatt, and Perraton term as a period of “thin globalization.” Hopkins proposes a different historical genealogy of globalization, dividing it into four phases: archaic, proto-, modern, and post-colonial (2002: 3). While this has the virtue of decentring the West, and positioning contemporary globalization in a long arc, the categories, by being defined in relation to the modern phase of globalization, unwittingly restore the rise of the West as their central narrative.

The efflorescence of historical studies of food in the last two decades strenuously reject a version of history that privileges the last quarter of the twentieth century as a watershed in the grand narrative of globalization. In fact, if anything, such writing for the most part tends to reinforce a version of history that stresses the continuous flow of foods and foodways over time. Food preparation and consumption, as the most intimate, everyday,

household activity, is a wonderful metric for the “depth” of globalization, and there is perhaps no better topic that is better explored in this regard than the global flow of spices.

MONOPOLY AND THE MAKING OF A DISTINCTIVE “EUROPEAN” CULINARY CULTURE

We are accustomed not to thinking of sugar as spice, but, rather, to thinking of sugar and spice.

SIDNEY MINTZ, *SWEETNESS AND POWER*

In their study of cooking techniques in southern Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Redon, Sabban, and Serventi conclude that “the main difference between a medieval master cook and a modern-day chef lay in the wealth of spices in his cupboard” (1998: 19). Lest there be any misunderstanding, they are not making this comparison in favor of the modern chef! Spices played an important role in medieval culinary arts, particularly as practiced among aristocratic and urban households, and were by no means limited to the elite; and spice merchants played a prominent role in the social order. (Why are spices so important to medieval Europe? Freedman’s *Out of the East* proposes some answers.)

What were the commonly used spices and why were they so routinely found in the kitchens of the wealthy in medieval Europe? Pepper was by far the most important, both in terms of quantities imported, and in its everyday utility (Pearson 1996a: xx), reaching humbler tables and more rural surroundings than its “finer” counterparts (Redon, Sabban, & Serventi 1998: 8). Cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon, and mace were the other important spices, with the first two considered the most precious (Freedman 2008: 108). In addition to these, there were long pepper, ginger, grains of paradise, and cumin; and saffron too played an important role as a flavoring and coloring agent.¹¹ The extent to which spices were employed can be gauged from the fact that a random sample of twenty-six dishes chosen from *The Medieval Kitchen* yielded eighteen that used at least one spice from Asia, of which eleven employed black pepper.¹²

The surprising popularity of spices, particularly pepper, in the diet of medieval Europe has often been attributed to a simple reason. Most cattle and other major livestock were slaughtered in the late autumn, as it was

not possible to feed the animals through the long winter. The meat then had to be preserved by smoking or salting for consumption in the next few months. It has been argued by some that pepper and other spices were used to disguise the semi-purrid smell of the rotting meat, especially as meat consumption increased in a prospering Europe (Pearson 1996a: xvi; Mintz 1985: 81).¹³ However, others dispute such functional explanations, since they cannot account either for the subtlety and precision with which spices were often used, or for the fact that fewer spices came to be used before improvements in the methods of preservation; and it certainly does not account for why a smaller quantity of spices were not used when meat and fish was fresh (Dalby 2000: 156; Mennell 1985: 53; Redon, Sabban, and Serventi 1998: 29).¹⁴ Whatever the merits of this argument, one thing is clear: spices served a large range of functions in the medieval European kitchen, and were used in a wide range of foods such as meat, fish, jam, soups, and drinks (Pearson 1996a: xvi).

What no one disputes is that the appetite for spices increased voraciously as Europe moved into its Age of Discovery. Cooking was only one of the many uses to which spices were put: they were important for their medicinal properties, as preservatives, and as an addition to wine (Mintz 1985: 78).¹⁵ Since most wine was drunk within a year, and techniques for preserving it were not yet well developed, spices made the coarse wines of the poor palatable and the mulled wines served on noble tables tastier (Pearson 1996a: xvii). A sweet, spiced red wine called *hypocras* was often served as the last course of a meal, along with cheese, candied fruits, and light cakes (Hensisch 1976: 105; Redon, Sabban, & Serventi 1998: 15). “Spices for the chamber” such as candied coriander and ginger, were also served after dinner, often in a private room to select guests, to aid in digestion and to sweeten the breath (Hensisch 1976: 105; Redon et al. 1998: 11).¹⁶ Such a use no doubt followed from a belief in the medical efficacy of spices. The medicinal use of spices was well established in South Asia and the Islamic world, and it slowly entered European medical practice through Arab pharmacology (Mintz 1985: 80; Pearson 1996a: xv). In fact, some of the earliest Portuguese sources on Indian spices were written by healers and pharmacologists (of whom Garcia da Orta and Tomé Pires are the best known).¹⁷

An important place among the spices was held by sugar. This is difficult to understand for the modern observer, as sugar’s role has been drastically redefined over the last few centuries. In the Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth century, sugar was as precious and difficult to obtain as other spices, and was used in much the same manner. Mintz makes this clear: “When it

was first introduced into Europe around 1100 C.E., sugar was grouped with spices pepper, nutmeg, mace, ginger, cardamom, coriander, galangale... saffron, and the like. Most of these were rare and expensive tropical (and exotic) imports, used sparingly by those who could afford them at all" (1983: 79–80). Unlike other spices, sugar gradually "changed from being a specialized medicinal, condimental, ritual, or display commodity into an ever more common food" (Mintz 1985: 37–38). Redon, Sabban, and Serventi comment that what "is most surprising to us about medieval cooking is its lack of interest in distinguishing sweet dishes from salty... Sweet and salty were simply not culinary categories" (1998: 27–28). Sugar was commonly added to dishes that contained other spices, dishes whose dominant flavor was not sweet. Like other spices, sugar played an important medicinal role. In fact, we have no reason to distinguish sugar from other spices (sugar and spice) but rather to think of sugar as one spice among others.¹⁸

All of these spices came to Europe through a flourishing trade that tied Southeast Asia and South Asia to the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf, from where they were transported overland to the southern Mediterranean, eventually finding their way into Europe, mainly through Venetian merchants (although Genoa was also an important center). Sugar cane cultivation came to Andalusia and Sicily with the Arabs, but sugar was also imported from North Africa; once again, Venice was the center for the European redistribution of sugar (Mintz 1985: 24). All spices, including sugar, thus shared some common characteristics.

Spices, and the spice trade, were to shape profoundly the nature of European "exploration" in the "Age of Discovery."¹⁹ As is well known, in this story of trade, monopoly, and colonization, the Portuguese were to play a pivotal role.²⁰ Without understanding the conflicts over spices (including sugar), one cannot understand global geopolitics in this age. Nor can one appreciate the rich history of global connections before the rise of sovereign states. Perhaps yet to be told is a detailed history of the role of colonization in the story of the rise of sovereign nation-states in Europe, which we know occurs much the same time as the Age of Discovery, and which could not have been unaffected by the resources and rivalries unleashed by the effort to monopolize the spice trade. This might, after Edward Said and postcolonial theory, appear to risk stating the obvious, yet such a project remains, so to speak, largely unexplored. What makes such Eurocentrism even more surprising was that this was a time, after all, when Europe was clearly not in the center, but on the margins of a world system centered around Asia and

the Middle East. The Peace Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, taken to inaugurate the model of the sovereign nation-state in Europe, occurred in the middle of what Boxer has called "The First World War." This was the fight between the Portuguese and the Dutch for control of the former's colonial possessions, a struggle that "was waged in four continents and on seven seas" (Boxer 1969: 106) and that unfolded for a large part of the seventeenth century (1600–63).²¹ The principle of sovereignty—"the entitlement to rule over a bounded territory" (Held et al. 1999: 37)—was formulated in an historical context in which rule over colonial territories and the division of such lands was already a subject of some concern to European states. Tilly notes that "the construction of external empires provided some of the means and some of the impetus for the fashioning of relatively powerful, centralized, and homogenized national states within the continent [of Europe]" (1990: 167).²² But even on those occasions when there is an acknowledgment of the imbrication of colonialism in the rise of sovereign states in Europe, it rarely forms an integral part of the analysis (Tilly 1990; Houbert 1998).²³

The growth of European involvement in the spice trade no doubt altered ecologies, production systems, and economies in the spice-growing areas as well, but little is known on that score. Were there changes in the methods and areas devoted to the cultivation of spices? Of course, we do see the dramatic example of the use of slaves and indentured labor in the production of sugar cane, but that coincided with sugar's transformation from a spice to an everyday commodity.

I do not intend to add to the rich primary literature that explores the Portuguese role in the spice trade in Asia (see especially Subrahmanyam 1993). What I wish to do is to draw certain links between processes of globalization whose affinities are often overlooked because of the scholarly divide between different bodies of water. On the one hand is an Atlantic Ocean-based scholarship that focuses largely on Spanish and Portuguese (and later English and French) connections with the New World and the west coast of Africa; on the other hand is a Pacific Ocean-based (really Indian Ocean-based) scholarship that focuses on Portuguese and Dutch (and later English and French) connections with South Asia, Southeast Asia, the east coast of Africa, and the Middle East.

In the Atlantic circuit, sugar emerges as a key product; in the Pacific circuit, black pepper is central, although other spices are important as well.²⁴ These two circuits were linked through the consumption of beverages such as tea and coffee, which married a product from one circuit (tea from China,

later India; coffee from Arabia, later Java) with a product from the other circuit (sugar from the New World).²⁵ But they were linked as well in the role played by the Portuguese in attempting to corner the European market for spices. Once sugar is incorporated into the story of spices, one begins to see a thread between Portuguese colonization in the New World and Portuguese actions in Asia. (It then makes it possible for me to link Brazil and India in the same story about globalization in the Age of Discovery).

It was not long after Vasco da Gama first reached Calicut in 1498 that the Portuguese managed to occupy the center of the European spice trade. Lisbon displaced Venice as the port that landed the largest volume of spices. These spices were then distributed to the rest of the continent through Antwerp, which became an important center of financing and redistribution. Lisbon and Antwerp bypassed Alexandria and Venice just seven years after Vasco da Gama's maiden voyage (Chandhuri 1985: 69). In fact, between 1505 and 1515, four times more spices entered Lisbon than Venice (Pearson 1996a: xxvi–xxvii). When he heard about the return cargoes of Portuguese ships in 1501, a contemporary in Venice glumly remarked: “to-day, with this new voyage by the King of Portugal, all the spices which came by way of Cairo will be controlled in Portugal, because of the caravels which will go to India, to Calicut, and other places. . . . And truly the Venetian merchants are in a bad way, believing that the voyages should make them very poor” (quoted in Chandhuri 1985: 64–65). Such an observation turned out to be on the mark: by 1515, Venice was humiliated into buying spices in Lisbon (Pearson 1996a: xxviii).

The rapidity with which the center of the European spice trade shifted to Lisbon had its parallels in that Atlantic spice, sugar. Portugal and Spain encouraged a new industry in sugar cane in their islands in the Atlantic, first in Madeira and Sao Tome after 1450, and later in the Canary Islands (Mintz 1985: 29–32). From the Spanish Canary Islands, Columbus took sugar cane with him to the New World in his second voyage in 1493. In the New World, sugar cane was first grown in Santo Domingo, and was being shipped back to Europe as early as 1516. And in the wake of sugar cane came slavery: “Santo Domingo’s pristine sugar industry was worked by enslaved Africans, the first slaves having been imported there soon after the sugar cane” (Mintz 1985: 32). The Portuguese took cane with them to Brazil, which took over as the leading supplier of sugar to Europe in the sixteenth century. In the century leading up to 1625, Portugal was supplying nearly all of Europe with sugar from Brazil (Mintz 1985: 38). Once again, Lisbon depended on Antwerp

for processing and distribution. Between the thirteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, Antwerp was the center for refining sugar in Europe and its subsequent sale (Mintz 1985: 45).

There were other connections between the Atlantic and the Pacific circuits of European colonization during the Age of Discovery. Although I have so far emphasized what the Europeans took from Asia, the crops that they took to Asia from the New World were to have enormous consequences for agricultural patterns and eating habits.²⁶ For example, the diet of the poor in South Asia is composed heavily of chilies and potatoes (and in some parts of the subcontinent, tapioca), all crops that were first introduced to India from the New World. Much of what passes for Indian food today in restaurants from Delhi to Birmingham to Rio is composed of foods native to the New World: chilies, potatoes, tomatoes, maize, groundnuts, and cashews. Fruits such as pineapple, papaya, cheeku, guava, avocado, and passion fruit have also found their way into the culinary cultures and eating habits of South Asians, who regard most of these products as a part of their inherited traditions.²⁷ The extent to which New World crops have found their way into “Indian” food is revealed by a random sample of fifty recipes from a contemporary Konkani cookbook, the *Rasachandrika*. The sample demonstrates that 74% of the recipes included at least one crop from the New World, and that 66% included red or green chilies.²⁸

Similarly, pasta and red sauce might be associated with the great traditions of Italian cooking, yet Europeans first encountered the tomato only after Columbus. Although it is taken as a truism in the literature in economics that the hardest thing to change are people’s preferences for the kinds of foods they like to eat (and hence that demand for certain types of food is relatively inelastic), the historical evidence demonstrates a truly remarkable plasticity in tastes and consumption patterns. Perhaps no other arena of social life demonstrates the hybridity of cultural encounters as thoroughly as the preparation, display, and consumption of food.²⁹

These new foods changed not only eating habits but also affected cropping patterns, land and water use, and forest cover as well. This is an area about which we know very little: What were the agricultural and ecological implications of this shift to New World crops? We know something about how the growing demand for spices altered the rhythms and patterns of pepper production as well as of other spices. Even at the height of European demand for spices, however, the major share of spice production was being shipped not to Europe, but to China and India, with their enormous domestic markets and

flourishing economies. But this story of the impact of New World crops and of changes in spice production is not very well researched compared to the major plantation crops, such as sugar, tea, coffee, and palm oil.

Even less explored is the link between agricultural shifts and the construction of people's ethnic and religious identities. In Goa, for example, there is a highly elaborated distinction between "Christian cooking" and "Hindu cooking" that relies on the selective use of ingredients, preparation techniques, and patterns of consumption. During the infamous Inquisition, which began in Goa in 1540 and lasted for about 200 years, one of the ways in which the Portuguese authorities discovered whether someone had genuinely converted or was merely pretending to have done so was by checking if they still followed the Hindu custom of cooking rice without salt.

CONCLUSION

I began this chapter with the observation that the last quarter of the twentieth century, rather than heralding a new age of globalization, might better be understood as a particular crisis of "high sovereignty" for the nation-state form in the First World. Viewed from what became the peripheral areas of a world system centered in northern Europe (this includes India as well as Portugal), what changed since 1250 was not the fact of globalization, but the forms that it took. From a system of open trading across land and sea that connected Southern Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia, we moved to a situation characterized by monopolistic practices, mass deportation of slaves, and enforced subjugation of peoples through colonialism. This too was a form of globalization, albeit an unhappy form for the hitherto flourishing civilizations around the Indian Ocean and in the New World.

This chapter demonstrates that by focusing on crops and cuisines, one can uncover some of the dynamics of the colonial phase of globalization. It is clear that colonization followed the spice trade, both in the East Indies and in the West Indies. A form of sovereignty emerged in which "mother countries" claimed different territories for themselves, and divided the globe amongst them. The Portuguese were soon displaced of their monopoly of the spice trade by the more efficient Dutch, who in turn were successfully challenged by the British.³⁰ After a few years in which they wrested control over the spice trade from Venice, the Portuguese had in any case lost the

initiative because of the revival of the spice trade through the Red Sea.³¹ On the sugar front, too, after the middle of the seventeenth century, the British started producing sugar in their own colonies. Processes of displacement and internecine struggle among colonizing powers became the hallmarks of this phase of globalization. But globalization in the colonial phase went along with the consolidation of a model of Westphalian sovereignty for the European colonizers. This was a model of sovereignty more than a practice because its ideological form eventually became dominant with the end of official colonialism, but its practice was never more than a fiction for the majority of dependent and peripheral nation-states. We have yet to come to terms with the various ways that colonialism and imperial expansion have shaped the formation of nation-states in Europe during the Age of Discovery and in the North more generally in subsequent eras.

A history of globalization that does not take the ideology of sovereign nation-states as its basic premise, or the self-understanding of Western industrial nation-states as its starting point, might better help us interpret the present. Hopkins, for example, has stressed that it is important "to prevent the history of globalization from becoming simply the story of the rise of the West—and the fall of the rest—under another name" (2002: 2). Few questions are as fraught today as that of identity. The paramouncy of national identity, never secure in most Third World nation-states, is being challenged as well in the dominant nation-states of the West. The problem of how to inculcate a national identity among people who shared nothing but a border had preoccupied modernization theorists in the aftermath of decolonization. Now, the need to create a national identity has been replaced by the fear that "ethnic" or "fundamentalist" identities are a problem for dominant states in the West.

Why is the question of identity rarely posed in terms of cuisine and crops in the scholarly literature while so much of the popular celebration of multiculturalism is in terms of a cosmopolitan consumerism? Is it because we scholars fear treading on a topic that is "shallow," or can too easily be co-opted into a new round of capitalist glutony? Crops and cuisine offer us an intimate window into how people construct class hierarchies, ethnic identities, gender differences, religious borders, and distinctions between the sacred and profane.³² When it is clear that such distinctions are not created out of eternal, stable substances and practices, but rapidly incorporate new commodities and relations, such as New World crops in Asian cuisines, the connection between globalization and identity becomes especially interesting. Crops,

cuisines, and consumption offer us a uniquely informative and important thread in the understanding of the history of globalization.

NOTES

I wish to thank Manishita Dass, Lalaie Ameeriar, Nejar Dinc, and Bhavna Munkundan for research assistance.

1. Virtual water is a measure of the water footprint of a commodity. In the case of a crop, it includes all the water that goes into its production and distribution, including the water needed for the machinery or the other commodities that go into its production.

2. Many of these books are histories of particular commodities: Coe & Coe (1996) on chocolate; L. Collingham (2006) on curry; Corn (1998), Dalby (2000), Milton (1999), and J. Turner (2005) on spices; Dharker (2005) on salt; Fischer & Benson (2006) on broccoli; Fussell (2004) on corn; Freidberg (2004) on French beans; Jenkins (2000) on bananas; Weaver (2000) on vegetables; Zuckerman (1998) on potatoes; and Willard (2001) on saffron. There are numerous ambitious or encyclopedic histories of food. Some examples include Toussaint-Samat (1998); Flandrin and Montanari (1999); Tannahill (1995).

3. Other sources that I have found useful in thinking about globalization include Appadurai (1996); Beynon & Dunkerley (2000); Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton (1999); Inda & Rosaldo (2002); McMichael (2000); Sassen (1996); and Tsing (2000).

4. This point emerged in an engagement with a paper presented by R. Radhakrishnan.

5. For example, Hopkins writes, "Today, as in the past, globalization remains an incomplete process: it promotes fragmentation as well as uniformity; it may recede as well as advance; its geographical scope may exhibit a strong regional bias; its future direction and speed cannot be predicted with confidence—and certainly not by presuming that it has an 'inner logic' of its own" (2002: 3).

6. See especially the account of the knowledge that African slaves brought to the cultivation of rice in the southern United States (Carney 2001).

7. On the construction of a national cuisine, see Möhring (2008) and Appadurai (1988). In this article, Appadurai does not focus on the role of immigration.

8. Tsing (2000: 344) writes, "This task requires that we study folk understandings of the global, and the practices with which they are intertwined, rather than representing globalization as a transcultural historical process." The point that Tsing is making here is that *any* attempt to represent globalization is someone's folk understanding of "the global," and that it is important for us to relate all theories of globalization to the sociological location from which that particular construction has arisen. Most discussions of globalization do not acknowledge that their own

maps are not "views from nowhere" but arise from particular structural and cultural locations.

9. The origins of coffee are often traced to Ethiopia (Hartox 1985: 13). However, Yemen was the major supplier of coffee to the Middle East and Europe until the early eighteenth century.

10. One could similarly argue that the diffusion of major "world" religions, technologies, and ideas (Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism; processes of making paper, silk, and gunpowder; knowledge of medicine, astronomy, and agriculture) before Europe's "Age of Discovery" has had a more profound impact on human civilizations than anything that came after. My point is not to make the case for one side versus another, but to caution that there is no one scale by which "impacts" can be measured.

11. Saffron and rose water had clearly been introduced to European palates by the Arabs, who were also the chief intermediaries in the spice trade.

12. The recipes reviewed were for split pea or dried fava bean soup, chickpea soup, lasagne, white ravioli, extemporaneous soup, white porce, white portara, green porce, watercress porce, black porce, asparagus with saffron, sauteed mushrooms, Le Menagier's civet of hare, sweet and sour civet of venison, chicken with fennel, chicken with lemon, brouer of capon, roast kid with sauce of gold, stuffed suckling pig, boublier of wild boar, chicken with orange sauce, sweet and sour fish, roast shad, grilled fish, dover sole with bitter orange juice, and curtlefish in black sauce.

13. This may be the origin of such recipes as "pepper streak" or beef tongue or roast strudded with cloves.

14. Menell (1985: 53–54) seeks to explain why fewer spices came to be used in medieval recipes by pointing out that using a smaller number and quantity of spices may have been one way in which finer cooks distinguished their art from inferior ones. But there is no reason why this effort at distinction should have necessarily led towards fewer spices, rather than their more precise combinations or more selective use, as in Thai or Indian cuisines.

15. Mintz mentions the five principal uses or "functions" of sucrose: as medicine, spice-condiment, decorative material, sweetener, and preservative.

16. This was not the only occasion at which spices were consumed. A historian writing of the eating habits of the rich has this to say, "Even when they are not at table they made free use of spiced comfits, partly for the sake of aiding digestion and partly to gratify the appetite" (Mead, quoted in Mintz 1985: 81).

17. See da Orta (1996) and Pires (1944).

18. "This usage of sugar as spice may have reached some sort of peak in the sixteenth century. Soon thereafter, prices, supplies, and customary uses began changing rapidly and radically" (Mintz 1985: 86).

19. I will use quotes for these terms for the first time only as it is not possible to use them without irony.

20. The story of the Portuguese empire is most famously told in Boxer (1969). See Pearson (1987) for a more detailed account of the Indian part of this story.

21. The fight between the Dutch and the Portuguese (Spain and Portugal were under a common crown from 1580 to 1640) began with an attack by Dutch warships on Príncipe and São Tomé in 1598–99 and ended with the capture of Portuguese settlements in Malabar in 1663 (Boxer 1969: 109).

22. Tilly does not follow through the implications of this statement for his own study of the European state system. Furthermore, as Radhika Mongia (2007) has pointed out, it is misleading to trace the rise of nation-states in Europe to such an early period; in fact, European nation-states can only be said to exist after the end of colonialism. Before that, European states were empire-states, since the colonies were an integral part of the state but not of the nation.

23. I have not dealt with the more difficult question of the role of colonialism in the ideology of the sovereign state.

24. The story of sugar has been brilliantly narrated by Mintz (1985).

25. On tea, see Forrest (1973); Pettigrew (2001); Scott (1964); and Ukers (1936).

26. A wonderful example of New World crops transplanted to the Indian subcontinent for colonial purposes is provided by *cinchona*, the antimalarial drug found in “tonic” water (Desmond 1992: 220–230).

27. The definitive guide to the origins of Indian food is two volumes by Achaya (1988a, 1988b).

28. The Konkan is a narrow strip on the west coast of India that was perhaps most profoundly altered by the ocean trade. The sample of recipes surveyed includes such staples as *sukke*, *talasani*, *ghashhi*, and *ambar*. I am grateful to Lalale Ameciar for sifting through this data.

29. Writing about the period 1600–1800, Hopkins (2002: 5) says, “Sugar, tobacco, tea, coffee, and opium entered circuits of exchange that created a complex pattern of multilateral trade across the world and encouraged a degree of convergence among consumers who otherwise inhabited different cultural spheres.”

30. See chapter 5 of Boxer’s *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825*, which focuses on the global struggle between the Portuguese and the Dutch.

31. For details and controversies about the nature of the spice trade, see Steensgaard (1996) and Wake (1996).

32. For instance, the literature on ethnic identity rarely mentions the role of cuisine in the construction of ethnicity. Clothing is sometimes analyzed in these terms (especially in Orientalist analyses of Otherness through practices such as veiling). The role of cuisine in national identity has been analyzed to some extent.

PART TWO

*The Princely-Colonial Encounter
and the Nationalist Response*